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Abstract  
Modern biometric systems based on face recognition demonstrate high recognition quality, but 
they are vulnerable to face presentation attacks, such as photo or replay attack. Existing face anti-
spoofing methods are mostly based on texture analysis and due to lack of training data either use 
hand-crafted features or fine-tuned pretrained deep models. In this paper we present a novel CNN-
based approach for face anti-spoofing, based on joint analysis of the presence of a spoofing medi-
um and eye blinking. For training our classifiers we propose the procedure of synthetic data gener-
ation which allows us to train powerful deep models from scratch. Experimental analysis on the 
challenging datasets (CASIA-FASD, NUUA Imposter) shows that our method can obtain state-of-
the-art results. 
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Introduction 
The problem of face recognition was widely studied 
for the last several decades and modern facial recognition 
algorithms already demonstrate superhuman recognition 
quality. But for real-case scenarios facial recognition sys-
tems should not only identify a face in front of the camera 
correctly, but also detect and process face spoofing at-
tacks, or presentation attacks. 
Indeed, the main purpose of a facial recognition sys-
tem is the accounting of human faces. In case when 
someone tries to fool the system with artificial face, the 
system should detect such behavior, and stop further pro-
cessing. There are many different types of face presenta-
tion attacks including print attack, replay attack, 3D 
masks, etc. As a result, face-based biometric systems can 
be very vulnerable to such presentation attacks. And in 
order to make facial recognition systems more secure, 
special anti-spoofing techniques should be used to classi-
fy whether input facial sample is real or fake. 
Depending on the type of features used for representa-
tion extraction, existing face anti-spoofing approaches 
can be divided into two groups: liveness-based methods 
and texture-based methods. Liveness based methods try 
to detect signs of life by tracking facial parts movements, 
such as eye blinking or lip movements. These methods 
are suitable only for static presentation attacks like print-
ing attack or photo replay attack, but inapplicable in case 
of dynamic attacks (e.g. video replay). Texture based 
techniques rely on the observation that real and fake face 
images contain some unique spatiotemporal properties 
which can help to discriminate between them. Such ap-
proaches potentially could be used for detection of both 
static and dynamic attacks, but because of weak explicit 
correlation between pixel intensities and attack presence, 
extracting robust texture features is quite challenging. 
Despite of significant success of using deep learning 
in computer vision tasks, many existing face anti-
spoofing methods are still based on hand-engineered fea-
tures. Obviously, such methods are not optimal, because 
the usage of hand-crafted features inevitably means the 
loss of some information. Nevertheless, there exist CNN 
based approaches for face anti-spoofing, but in order to 
avoid overfitting most of them either use very simple 
models or fine-tune existing image classification models. 
The main reason of such situation is a lack of training 
data, which is the key condition for successful application 
of deep models. Indeed, existing face anti-spoofing da-
tasets are quite small, and not sufficient for training pow-
erful deep model from scratch. At the same time, because 
of specificity of face spoofing detection task, it is almost 
impossible to mine fake face images in the Internet. 
To avoid this limitation, we propose a new technique 
for generation of synthetic fake face images. To generate 
our synthetic data, we have prepared a set of possible 
spoofing medium templates (printing paper, different 
models of mobile phones and tablets) and a set of real 
face images. To produce synthetic image, we insert face 
image into spoofing medium and place this medium into 
some background image. All steps are done stochastical-
ly, and it allows us to produce arbitrarily large dataset and 
use it to train powerful face anti-spoofing deep model 
from scratch. In addition to spoofing medium detection, 
we propose to use motion-based information. More pre-
cisely, we train deep neural network for human eyes 
openness classification on images, and use it to analyze 
the presence of eye blinking on videos. In order to com-
bine outputs from two classifiers in complementary way, 
special fusion strategy is proposed in this paper. Result-
ing algorithm achieves state-of-the-art results on detect-
ing printing and replay attacks on CASIA-FASD [1] and 
NUAA Impostor [2] datasets. An overview of our ap-
proach is presented in Fig. 1. 
The main contributions of this paper can be summa-
rized as follows: 
• Our proposed method simultaneously determines the 
presence of spoofing medium around the face area, and 
analyzes liveness of this face. 
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• We propose a new method for generating synthetic 
fake face images, which allows to train complex deep 
models for spoofing medium detection from scratch. 
• We achieve state-of-the-art performance on two 
publicly available face anti-spoofing datasets. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 
I presents a review of related works. In Section II we de-
scribe our approach in details. Our experimental setup 
and results are reported in Section III. Conclusions are 
finally drawn in the last section. 
 
Fig. 1. Overview of our approach. Input video frames are independently processed by two submodules: the first one is trained with 
synthetic data and performs spoofing medium detection, while the second analyzes eyes area. Per-frame scores from each module 
are aggregated and resulting values serve as input to the score fusion module, which produces overall liveness score 
I. Related work 
In this section we review the prior face anti-spoofing 
approaches in four groups: texture-based methods, live- 
ness methods, existing multi-cues approaches, and apply-
ing of Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN) for face 
anti-spoofing.  
A. Texture analysis for face anti-spoofing 
Such methods are based on the assumption that real and 
fake faces images contain different texture patterns. Appar-
ently, this is because of face recapturing process, which 
leads to facial texture quality degradation and differences in 
reflectance properties. In order to capture such implicit tex-
ture patterns, a great number of prior work utilize hand-
engineered local texture features, such as HOG [3], [4], DoG 
[1], [2], [6], SIFT [7], SURF [12], or LBP variations [8 – 11], 
[31], and adopt traditional classifiers such as Support Vector 
Machines or Softmax classifiers. To extract more discrimi-
native features and get over the influence of illumination 
some papers propose not to use common RGB color space, 
and switch to another input domain, such as HSV [7], [9], 
[13] or YCbCr [9], [13]. 
B. Face liveness detection 
The liveness detection approach aims at detecting vi-
tal signs through analyzing human face motion. The rea-
son why motion analysis is a good spoofing counter-
measure is that the movement characteristics of rigid pla-
nar objects, like photo prints or tablet display, differs sig-
nificantly from that of real human faces which are com-
plex non-rigid 3D objects. The most common temporal 
cues used for liveness detection are facial expression al-
terations [8], [16], eye blinking [14 – 16], [38], and lip 
movements [17], [18]. Instead of analyzing specific face 
parts, some approaches use more general motion features 
and techniques, like optical flow analysis [19], [20], [22], 
Euler motion magnification [21], local speed patterns 
[34], Shearlet-based features [22] and recurrent neural 
networks [23]. Motion-based methods are usually effec-
tive to printing and photo replay attacks, but become 
powerless under video replay attacks and printing attacks 
with cut out eyes or lips area. 
C. Multi-cues face anti-spoofing 
Some works present multi-cues methods that integrate 
evidence from multiple complementary sources. The idea 
behind such approach is that anti-spoofing features rely-
ing on a single cue can be not effective for all kinds of 
presentation attacks, while combining cues of different 
nature can result in more robust anti-spoofing system. So, 
in [35] and [22] authors proposed to combine some tex-
ture features (color histograms, Gabor features, LBP, etc.) 
with motion analysis (local face motion, correlation be-
tween the face and background regions), and fuse results 
at a score level. Pereira et al. [5] also analyzed texture 
and motion cues, but combined results through features 
concatenation. In [22] Feng et al. built multi-cues face an-
ti-spoofing system, which aggregates image quality fea-
tures and optical flow maps in one neural network. Au-
thors of [32] proposed to fuse deep features and diffu-
sion-kernel features to achieve better performance. Re-
cently, Atoum et al. [13] proposed to use depth infor-
mation in addition to texture in their two-stream convolu-
tional neural network model. 
D. CNN based face anti-spoofing 
Convolutional Neural Networks have proven to be ef-
fective in a wide range of computer vision problems. As 
for facial analysis, modern deep learning approaches con-
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sistently outperform other learning paradigms in the tasks 
of face detection and face recognition. However, in the 
face anti-spoofing area, the use of deep convolutional 
networks is still not so common, and has not been suffi-
ciently investigated. Most of the existing CNN-based ap-
proaches rely on the assumption of existing discrimina-
tive texture patterns for live and spoof examples, and try 
to automatically compose a model for extraction of such 
features. In [25], Yang et al. propose to learn AlexNet 
and use output from one of its hidden layers as input to 
SVM classifier. The work of [23] adopts a CNN-LSTM 
architecture for joint analysis of multiple video frames. 
CNN based methods reliably outperform most of the 
methods based on hand-engineered features, but are like-
ly prone to overfitting. Because of insufficient amount of 
available data, learning robust deep models for face anti- 
spoofing from scratch can be hard and usually result in 
their weak generalization ability [25], [16]. That is why in 
some works [16], [26] models are pretrained on ImageNet 
and then only fine-tuned on dataset of target domain. Au-
thors of [22] and [33] propose to combine hand-crafted 
features with deep learning techniques to ease the process 
of model training and avoid overfitting. In this work, we 
further explore the use of CNNs in face anti-spoofing 
task, and propose a way to construct robust deep classifi-
ers for analyzing the presence of spoofing medium and 
human eye blinking. 
II. Proposed method 
In this paper we propose a new method of detection of 
2D facial spoofing attacks which can be presented with face 
photo print or replay on some device. In order to deal with 
such attacks, we propose to analyze two types of comple-
mentary features: visibility of spoofing medium in front of 
the camera and presence of eye blinking. Our algorithm con-
sists of three modules: spoofing medium detector, eye blink-
ing detector and scores fusion module. Detailed description 
of each module is given in the following subsections. 
A. Spoofing medium presence detection 
The idea behind the medium detection is very simple and 
natural: if one object appears in front of some other objects, 
there inevitably will become visible texture discontinuities 
on the boundaries of the foreground object. It is true both for 
photo prints and video replays from mobile phones or tab-
lets, and we propose to create an algorithm for detecting the 
presence of such discontinuities on face images.  
To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first at-
tempt to perform explicit spoofing medium detection to 
determine face presentation attacks, while some existing 
face anti-spoofing works also use context information. 
So, in [3] and [25] texture analysis on extended face 
bounding boxes was performed. Authors of [22] used op-
tical flow maps computed on uncropped frames to capture 
spoofing medium movements.  
In recent years huge progress in computer vision area 
has been made with the help of deep convolutional net-
works, and our spoofing medium detector is also based 
on deep CNN architecture. One of the main reasons why 
deep learning is so successful is the availability of large 
task-specific datasets (e.g. ImageNet for object classifica-
tion), but for face anti-spoofing task existing datasets are 
relatively small and hardly can be used for training com-
plex deep models. To struggle with this problem, we pro-
pose a new method of synthetic data generation, which 
allows us to generate arbitrarily large amount of fake face 
images and therefore to train deep face anti-spoofing 
models with good generalization ability. To our 
knowledge it is the first attempt to use synthetic data for 
face spoofing medium detector training. 
1) Synthetic data generation: We propose the algo-
rithm for synthetic data generation, which allows to cre-
ate images with print and replay face presentation attacks. 
The process of generating synthetic fake face image is the 
following (see visualization in Fig. 2): 
1) Take an arbitrary face image and localize its bounding 
box using facial detector. 
2) Apply some jittering to the found facial area, like ran-
dom shifting, scaling and rotation. Crop face image 
using augmented bounding box. 
3) Randomly choose a spoofing medium template image 
and paste the face image from the previous step inside 
of it. (A set of spoofing medium templates should be 
prepared in advance. In our case it consists of a blank 
image of standard size, and normalized images with 
mobile phones and tablets of different mades). 
4) Take an arbitrary background image and choose 4 points 
on it. These points will define the area where spoofing 
medium with face image will be inserted, and should be 
chosen so that the ratio between inter-points distances 
will roughly match the ratio between medium template 
image sides. For better realism you can use image with 
human upper body and choose points for medium inser-
tion in the area of human’s head. 
5) Estimate homography from point correspondences 
and insert medium template with face image to the 
background image using projective transformation. 
 
Fig. 2. Synthetic data generation process 
Because of indeterministic nature of the process, hav-
ing large enough dataset for faces sampling and repeating 
these steps, we can generate any number of synthetic fake 
face images. Unlimited amount of training data allows us 
to train complex deep classification models even from 
scratch.  
In this work we consider only attacks when spoofing 
medium is entirely visible, and our synthetic data generation 
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process is adjusted accordingly. This condition is usually 
kept in real-life cases, since in practice if one can’t see what 
the camera sees, it is not easy to place spoofing medium in a 
way that medium’s edges become invisible. 
2) Deep medium presence classifier: The ability to 
generate unlimited number of train images allows us to 
train complex deep classification models without thinking 
too much about overfitting, which is a big problem for 
many existing approaches. As a result, relying on the 
analysis of the spoofing medium presence, we can get 
more accurate binary face spoofing classifier compared to 
the previously proposed. 
To train our model we prepare the dataset with human 
face images of two classes, the first one is real human 
photos and the second one is synthetically generated face 
spoofing images. We use extended face bounding box ar-
ea as input to our deep neural network. The reason why 
we extend the input area is that it allows to model larger 
variety of face size and position relatively to the spoofing 
medium. The exact value of bounding box extension has 
a strong impact on the resulting classification quality. 
Through the series of experiments, we found that the op-
timal extension factor is 4.0, and use such value in all 
subsequent experiments. Resulting classifier can process 
only single images, and to classify video sequence as real 
or fake, we process each frame independently and average 
predictions. 
B. Eye blinking detection 
The second feature we analyze is the presence of eye 
blinking on a face video sequence. To determine whether 
eyes blink on a video we create a simple yet effective 
eyes openness classifier which is applied for each video 
frame. This classifier outputs the probability that eyes are 
open on the input image, and to classify the whole video 
sequence we analyze the difference between the maxi-
mum and the minimum probabilities. If the resulting dif-
ference is big enough, it means that there is at least one 
transition between open and closed eyes in the input vid-
eo sequence. See the Fig. 3. 
 
Fig. 3. Eye blinking detection scheme. Eyes area on each frame is detected using facial feature points detector. Detected areas are 
filtered, and erroneous detections are dropped.  
Correct patches are used as input to eyes openness classifier and processed independently. Resulting set of openness scores  
is aggregated to obtain video blinking score 
1) Eyes openness classifier: To train the eyes open-
ness classifier we prepared a small dataset with images of 
two classes: open eyes and closed eyes. Our dataset was 
com-posed of publicly available Closed Eyes In The Wild 
dataset [29] and manually labeled human face images. 
We use a rectangular patch around the human eyes as in-
put to the openness classifier. In order to precisely local-
ize eyes position, we use facial points detector from the 
Tevian FaceSDK library [27]. 
The task of classification of tightly localized eyes as 
open or closed is relatively simple, but sometimes facial 
points detector can make mistakes and output points loca-
tions can be erroneous. Usage of such wrong points de-
tections for eyes openness classification is impermissible 
because the output of classifier on the wrong input area is 
completely unpredictable. That is why we use additional 
helper network for eyes area detection filtering to in-
crease the stability of eye blinking detection. 
2) Facial points filtering: The facial points filtering is 
conducted every time before eyes openness classification 
and its main goal is to analyze image patch with eyes area 
and classify it as wrong or correct. In case the eyes area is 
wrongly detected, this frame is dropped and isn’t used for 
further analysis. 
To train filtering network we automatically gener-
ated a dataset with two classes: positive class images 
with correct eyes area and negative class images with 
strongly shifted eyes area or even with non-eyes area. 
To crop images of positive class we use exactly the 
same cropping strategy as for eyes openness classifier, 
and to crop images of negative class we use randomly 
shifted facial points. The range of shifting was chosen 
experimentally, through analysis of the quality degra-
dation of eyes openness classifier depending on the 
points shifting distance. 
C. Fusion strategy 
Both of the discussed above approaches (spoofing me-
dium detection and eye blinking detection) could be used 
for face spoofing detection independently. But using two 
different types of features simultaneously could improve 
the quality and robustness of face anti-spoofing system. 
Since our classifiers process each video frame inde-
pendently, aggregate their results and output scalar 
liveness scores, then the only possible way of their com-
bination is the fusion at score level. We studied 3 differ-
ent score fusion approaches: logistic regression, scores 
multiplication, and scores minimum. 
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Fusion through logistic regression means that we esti-
mate the significance of each classifier and calculate its con-
tribution to the final result according to its weight. The 
scores multiplication approach assumes that classifiers are 
tantamount, and the final score will be high only if all 
classifiers output high score. The scores minimum approach 
can be considered as harder version of the scores multiplica-
tion fusion method: the final decision is based only on the 
least confident classifier. All three fusion methods written 
mathematically are presented in Table 1. Here Scoremedium 
and Scoreblinking mean outputs from spoofing medium pres-
ence classifier and eye blinking classifier, respectively. 
Table 1. Investigated score fusion formulas 
Fusion method Formula for final score computation 
Logistic 
regression 1 2
* *medium blinkingw Score w Score  
Scores 
multiplication 
 *medium blinkingScore Score  
Scores minimum  min( , )medium blinkingScore Score  
Because of the fact that the raw outputs of two inde-
pendent classifiers can’t be compared explicitly, we pro-
pose to map their output scores to a common scale, before 
the fusion (this step is necessary for scores multiplication 
and scores minimum approaches, while can be omitted in 
case of logistic regression fusion). In Table 1 mapped 
score values are marked with the hat. 
In order to perform such mapping, we manually chose 
a set of key points in terms of error rates, and for each 
classifier we estimate a piecewise linear transform using 
these points. This transformation maps raw classifier 
score to a [0, 1] interval. The correspondence we used be-
tween error rates and mapped score values is presented in 
Table 2. Here FNR stands for False Negative Rate, and 
FPR stands for False Positive Rate. In our experiments 
we used additional held-out dataset for scores mapping 
weights computation. 
Table 2. Correspondence used for score mapping estimation 
Key point Mapped score 
FNR = 0.0001 0.1 
FNR = 0.001 0.2 
FNR = 0.01 0.3 
FNR = 0.1 0.4 
FNR = FPR 0.5 
FPR = 0.1 0.6 
FPR = 0.01 0.7 
FPR = 0.001 0.8 
FPR = 0.0001 0.9 
III. Experiments 
In this section, we first briefly describe two bench-
mark datasets and the setup that was used in our experi-
ments. Then, experimental results analysis is provided. 
A. Datasets 
To evaluate the effectiveness of our face anti-spoofing 
approach, we performed a set of experiments using two 
publicly available datasets: CASIA Face Anti-Spoofing 
Database [1] and NUAA Photograph Imposter Database 
[2]. These benchmark datasets are quite challenging and 
include recordings of various 2D face spoofing attack at-
tempts. In addition, most fake videos in these datasets 
contain at least partly visible spoofing medium, while it is 
not the case for many other existing datasets [36], [37]. 
The CASIA Face Anti-spoofing database (CASIA-
FASD) contains 50 genuine subjects, and for each subject 
there are 12 real and fake videos captured under varying 
imaging quality and camera resolution. Three presenta-
tion attacks were designed: warped photo attack, cut pho-
to attacks (eye blinking is presented), and video replay at-
tacks. In total, the dataset includes 600 video recordings, 
which are divided into two subject-disjoint subsets for 
training and testing (240 and 360, respectively). 
The NUAA dataset consists of 12 614 images extract-
ed from real and fake face videos of 15 subjects captured 
on a webcam in three sessions with different place and il-
lumination conditions. Face spoofing attacks presented in 
the dataset are based on hand-held printed face photos. 
All images are divided into training and test non-
overlapping sets. Training set includes 1 743 real images 
and 1 748 fake images, and test set comprises 3 362 real 
images and 5 761 fake face images. 
In our experiments we followed standard protocols of 
the datasets, and measured Equal Error Rate (EER) and 
classification accuracy, on CASIA-FASD and NUAA da-
tasets respectively. On CASIA-FASD database, in our 
experiments we exclude 1 video record from each sub-
ject, in order to perform correct evaluation. We call the 
resulting dataset “fair subset”. Excluded videos contain 
video replay attacks with tablet display placed very close 
to camera, such that medium boundaries are invisible. In 
such conditions none of our classifiers can detect spoof-
ing attempt even theoretically, that is why the quality of 
our approach drops on the full dataset. 
B. Implementation details 
In this section we describe in details neural net archi-
tectures, training datasets, and optimization parameters 
we used during our experiments.  
1) Net architectures: The neural architectures we used 
in our experiments are quite simple yet effective. For me-
dium presence detection we use 112112 color images as 
input, and the classification network is based on the Res-
Net architecture [28]. It consists of 10 convolutional and 
one fully connected layers. Each convolutional layer is 
followed by batch normalization and ReLU activation 
layers. The network for eyes openness classification takes 
50×100 color image as input and uses plain convolutional 
architecture with max-pooling layers. Rectified linear ac-
tivations (without any normalization) are used after each 
convolutional layer. The same architecture is used for 
eyes area filtering. At the output of each network there is 
fully connected layer with 2 neurons for binary 
classification. The detailed configurations of our networks 
are presented in Table 3 and Table 4. We use the follow-
ing notation: 
 ”ConvX [3×3, 64], S1” denotes convolution layer with 
64 filters of size 3×3 and stride = 1.  
 ”PoolX [2×2, MAX], S2” stands for max-pooling lay-
er with 2×2 pooling area, and stride = 2.  
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 ”FC5 512” is the fully connected layer with 512 hid-
den units.  
 Residual blocks are shown in two-line brackets.  
Table 3. Neural architecture: spoofing medium detection 
Layer name Layer parameters 
Conv1.1 [3×3,48],  S2 



































Conv4.1 [3×3,384],  S2 
FC5 512 
Table 4. Neural architecture: eyes openness classification and 
eyes area filtering 
Layer name Layer parameters 
Conv1  3 3,32 , 1S  
Pool1  2 2, , 2MAX S  
Conv2  3 3, 64 , 1S  
Pool2  2 2, , 2MAX S  
Conv3  3 3,96 , 1S  
Pool3  2 2, , 2MAX S  
Conv4  3 3,128 , 1S  
Pool4  2 2, , 2MAX S  
Conv5  3 3, 256 , 1S  
Pool5  ,GLOBAL AVERAGE  
 
Considering computation complexity of neural network 
forward pass, spoofing medium presence classifier has com-
plexity of 500 MFLOPs, while eyes openness classification 
and face area classification networks have complexity of 65 
MFLOPs each. 
2) Training datasets: To train our spoofing medium 
detector we have prepared 45k images of real human fac-
es and generated 135k synthetic fake face images. As a 
result, we have a dataset of total size of 180k images with 
1:3 ratio of real and fake faces. During synthetic images 
generation we use 3 spoofing medium templates: Apple 
iPad tablet, Samsung Galaxy smartphone, and an empty 
template with fixed aspect ratio (to simulate printing pho-
to attacks). Examples of generated fake images are pre-
sented in Fig. 4. 
For eyes openness classifier training we combined the 
Closed Eyes In The Wild dataset [29] with our own set of 
eyes images. We collected 82 short videos with frontal 
human faces of 11 subjects, extracted its frames with the 
rate of 10 fps, and manually labeled them depending on 
whether eyes are opened or closed. Resulting dataset 
comprises 4 195 open eyes images and 2 098 closed eyes 
images. 
 
Fig. 4. Examples of generated fake face images 
The dataset we used to train eyes area filtering network 
is based on the eyes openness dataset and was constructed 
automatically. Namely, for each image from the eyes open-
ness dataset we derived two images: the first one is the orig-
inal image itself, and the second one is randomly shifted im-
age crop. As a result, training dataset contains both open and 
closed eyes images in positive and negative class. The shift-
ing distance was chosen experimentally, and to determine 
lower boundary we studied eyes openness classification ac-
curacy depending on shifting distance. So, for the input im-
age size of 50100 pixels, we sample shifting distance in the 
range between 9 and 40 pixels. 
In order to increase data variety, we enable image 
augmentation during training. In all our experiments we 
use standard set of augmentations which includes random 
mirroring, random cropping, and random rotation. 
3) Training parameters settings: We built our net-
works using MXNet framework [30] and trained them by 
optimizing cross-entropy loss. In all our experiments we 
used stochastic gradient descent with momentum = 0.9 
and batch size of 512 examples. We train our spoofing 
medium presence classifier for 40k iterations, starting 
with learning rate of 0.001 and decreasing it every 10k it-
erations. To train our eyes openness classifier and face 
area classifier we initialize learning rate to 0.01 and de-
crease it every 5k iterations, with the total of 25k itera-
tions. For all our networks learning rate decreasing coef-
ficient was set to 0.1. 
We performed all our experiments on a desktop with Intel 
Core i7-4770 (3.40 GHz) CPU, NVIDIA TITAN X GPU, and 
32 Gb RAM. It takes about 4 hours to train spoofing medium 
presence classifier, and about 30 minutes to train eyes open-
ness classifier or face area classifier. 
C. Experimental results 
In this section we present and discuss results we have 
obtained during our experiments with spoofing medium 
detector by itself, and with its combination with eye 
blinking detector. 
1) Spoofing medium detector evaluation: First of all, we 
present image-level results for our spoofing medium pres-
ence detector. In this experiment we independently classify 
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each video frame as containing real or fake human face. It is 
a common way of evaluation of face anti-spoofing methods. 
Here we compare results of two different models: one 
was trained only using synthetic fake data, and to get an-
other one we fine-tuned the first model using training 
subset of the corresponding database. To fine-tune our 
models we set learning rate to 1e-5 and train them for 5k 
iterations. Results are presented in Table 5 and Table 6. 
For fair comparison with existing methods on CASIA-
FASD, we evaluated them on the same testing subset 
which was used for our method (described in subsection 
III-A), while using the full training set. In this CASIA-
FASD experiment we used author’s implementations of 
[9] and [12], and our own implementation of [25]. 
Table 5. Frame-level results on CASIA-FASD 
Method EER, fair subset 
EER, 
full 
Spoofing medium detector, 
only synthetic data 0.0701 0.1156 
Spoofing medium detector, 
fine-tuned (CASIA-train) 0.0144 0.0432 
SURF + Softmax [12] 0.0272 0.0280 
LBP + SVM [9] 0.0701 0.0620 
CNN + SVM [25] 0.0436 0.0492 
As can be seen from the tables 5 and 6, our fine-tuned 
models reach state-of-the-art results. Moreover, by train-
ing only on synthetic data we can get competitive per-
formance simultaneously on both testing datasets. Such 
behavior proves high generalization ability of our ap-
proach. To better visualize importance of pretraining with 
synthetic data, we conduct additional experiment, where 
the same network architecture was trained from scratch 
on the CASIA training set. Resulting network demon-
strates pretty good results on the CASIA test set 
(EER = 0.0821), but the classification accuracy on the 
NUAA dataset drops significantly (64.7 %). So, it proves 
the fact that using of small training dataset leads to 
overfitting, and complete inapplicability of the resulting 
model in real life. At the same time, by using our synthet-
ic data we can pretrain model with good generalization 
ability, and by additional training on the target data we 
can just slightly tune it. 
Table 6. Frame-level results on NUAA Impostor Database 
Method Accuracy, % 
Spoofing medium detector,  
only synthetic data 98.5 
Spoofing medium detector,  
fine-tuned (NUAA-train) 99.2 
SPMT [31] 98.0 
ADKMM [32] 99.3 
ND-CNN [33] 99.0 
DS-LSP [34] 98.5 
CDD [4] 97.7 
DoG-SL [6] 94.5 
2) Video-level face anti-spoofing: As we mentioned in 
previous section, existing face anti-spoofing methods most-
ly perform classification at frame-level. Obviously, such 
evaluation is conceptually incorrect, because in practice 
face recognition systems usually have video sequence as its 
input instead of a single frame. That is why in this paper 
we present video-level evaluation results as well. 
Table 7. Video-level results: spoofing medium detector 
Method CASIA-FASD,  EER 
NUAA,  
Accuracy 
Spoofing medium detector, 
only synthetic data 0.0542 98.8% 
Spoofing medium detector, 
fine-tuned 0.0083 100% 
From Table 7 it can be seen that the proposed 
spoofing medium detector classifier demonstrates good 
video-level quality. What’s more, fine-tuned models 
reach near perfect results. 
3) Combined model evaluation: By incorporating evi-
dence from eye blinking classifier we can further improve 
video-level classification quality. We performed score fusion 
strategies comparison on CASIA database. During this set of 
experiments, we used spoofing medium classifier trained on-
ly on synthetic data, in order to better demonstrate how each 
score aggregation approach influences on resulting quality. 
Results are presented in Table 8. 
Table 8. Score fusion strategies comparison on CASIA-FASD 
Method EER, fair subset 
EER, 
full 
Spoofing medium detection only 0.0542 0.1111 
Combined: Logistic regression 0.0125 0.0667 
Combined: Scores multiplication 0.0111 0.0963 
Combined: Scores minimum 0.0333 0.1111 
According to the results, we can find that for the fair 
subset no matter what fusion strategy is used, resulting 
quality becomes better when information from additional 
classifier is aggregated. Besides, fusion approach based 
on scores multiplication provides the best results. Moreo-
ver, resulting EER value (0.0111) is very close to the 
EER value obtained by the fine-tuned spoofing medium 
detector (0.0083). 
In addition, we performed evaluation of combined ap-
proach using fine-tuned spoofing detector model on the fair 
subset. For any score fusion approach, resulting method 
gives EER of 0.0, i.e. it provides perfect separability of real 
and fake videos. To better visualize how adding of eye 
blinking information (by multiplication fusion) improves 
quality even for fine-tuned spoofing medium detector, we 
plot liveness score distributions for both methods in Fig. 5. It 
can be seen that combined approach provides more distinct 
separability between classes. 
Conclusion 
This paper proposes a novel face anti-spoofing ap-
proach based on fusing results of two deep classifiers. 
The first one performs classification of spoofing medium 
presence, and in order to avoid overfitting we introduce 
synthetic data generation procedure. The second classifier 
analyzes eye blinking and is based on per-frame eyes 
openness classification. The experiments show that even 
spoofing medium detector by itself can provide competi-
tive results and high generalization ability for the task of 
frame-level face anti-spoofing. And by combining two 
classifiers together we can reach perfect classification 
quality for video-level scenario on CASIA face anti-
spoofing database. 
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Fig. 5. CASIA-FASD video-level liveness score histograms: (a) spoofing medium detector only; (b) combined method 
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